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Abstract
This paper explores the ongoing events surrounding the CAMPFIRE project of Mahenye in Zimbabwe within the context of the recent discourse of crisis within community based 
natural resource management (CBNRM) and crisis within the country 
itself. Despite Mahenye’s geographical isolation and small size, it 
has played an influential role in the history and practice of CBNRM 
nationally and internationally over the last two decades. 
Through an analysis of the perspectives and stories of the people 
of Mahenye and other stakeholders, it explores whether the current 
problems encountered in Mahenye are manifestations of crisis 
or whether they represent positive evolution and resilience in the 
face of adversity. The evidence suggests that CBNRM is a process 
of applied and incremental experiments in democracy, which is of 
particular value because of the interaction of tiers of governance over 
time in an adaptive process. Despite the manifest problems within 
Mahenye, evidence suggests that CAMPFIRE has had a positive 
impact in terms of empowering local residents, providing them with 
incentives, knowledge and organisational abilities to identify and 
address problems and constraints and to identify where external 
interventions are required. This analysis illustrates that CBNRM is a 
political process and that implementers and policy advocates need to 
appreciate power relations and political landscapes in the quest for 
better governance. 
The paper concludes that there are two critical elements 
requiring further attention by implementers. Firstly, there is need to 
restructure the economic mechanisms of CAMPFIRE in the face of the 
current national economic crisis. Secondly, there is a need to focus 
on and develop mechanisms that tackle the practical governance 
arrangements between the first and second tier institutions, in 
order to break down the existing social and politically constructed 
stalemates.  
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Mahenye Ward in the south-east periphery of Zimbabwe in Chipinge District covers only 210 km2 and has a population of less than 1,000 households. However, its impact and reach 
over the past two decades in the history and practice of community 
based natural resource management (CBNRM) nationally, regionally 
and internationally belies its size or remoteness. 
In the early 1990s Mahenye was the reference point for a widely 
influential publication, The Lesson from Mahenye: Rural Poverty, 
Democracy and Wildlife, that drew on the CAMPFIRE and pre-
CAMPFIRE initiatives of the ward and its people to articulate the 
links between local democracy, development and natural resources 
(Murphree1995). Murphree was not alone: many others throughout 
the 1990s also upheld Mahenye as one of the prime exemplars of 
CAMPFIRE as a successful sustainable development model (Borrini-
Feyerabend 1997; Child, Ward & Tawengwa 1996; Child 1995; 
Peterson 1991; Zimbabwe Trust 1991). This recognition culminated 
in a follow-up case study undertaken in the late 1990s by Murphree 
on Mahenye’s diversification in natural resource management and 
income generation by mixing sport hunting with eco-tourism ventures 
(Murphree 2001). In this the ward’s entrepreneurial history was 
documented, its story of a positive message of success in the face 
of bureaucratic constraints was detailed and the need for further 
devolution from the existing scale of authority held at district level to 
be vested at ward level was persuasively argued. 
The key factors identified by Murphree in this paper were ‘the 
insights, ingenuity and commitment of socially dedicated individuals 
in positions of influence or leadership, balanced sources of traditional 
and popular legitimation,’ an ‘enlightened private sector’, a capacity 
for flexibility and acceptance of innovation, and intra-communal 
cohesiveness resulting from:
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‘… in-group solidarity rooted in history and reinforced by 
perceptions of external differences … Like any community, 
Mahenye has its internal differentiations but these have been 
contained by a sense of collective communal interest. The 
importance of this cannot be overstressed ...’ (Murphree 2001)
The lessons from Mahenye drawn since the early 2000s to the 
present have ranged from the ambivalent questioning of elements of 
CBNRM to direct critiques of the full devolution model. For example, 
Munyaka and Mandizadza (2004) present more hesitant conclusions 
than earlier authors about the benefits and needs for devolution of 
authority from district to ward level. In contrast, Balint and Mashinya 
(In press) and Balint (2005) are direct in arguing for caution in any 
promotion of full devolution:
‘Our study reveals the decline of a promising CBNRM programme. 
We found that the Mahenye community no longer receives the 
flow of significant social and economic benefits reported in earlier 
studies.’ (Balint 2005)  
Their concerns include the concept of ‘community’ in CBNRM and 
how much authority should be devolved to communities. They ask, 
‘how can an independent, democratic, participatory governing process 
be helped to survive in a traditional, hierarchical, feudal society?’ and 
speak of ‘community members … now alienated, disillusioned, angry 
and scared’ and of ‘outsiders who should be overseeing the project … 
[who] are blind to the problems’. Furthermore, the CBNRM initiative 
has been ‘hijacked by the family of the traditional chief and proceeds 
… skimmed off by the ruling clan’.
This is a very different discourse about Mahenye, its CBNRM 
initiative, the key factors driving it, the lessons and questions to 
be drawn from it and what the wider lessons could be. It presents 
a completely contrasting view (to the point of being almost un-
recognisable) of the same small ward, its inhabitants and their social 
dynamics, in the short space of five years. 
The narratives and counter narratives1 about Mahenye and its 
CBNRM initiative matter not only because of their direct effect on 
the people of the ward, their survival and their future livelihoods; 
they also matter because (as with earlier stories and lessons from 
Mahenye) the ward’s impact reaches far beyond a peripheral zone of 
Zimbabwe. The recent narrative of crisis in CAMPFIRE in Mahenye 
Ward, in questioning the ‘model’ of full devolution of natural resource 
governance, in local elite capture of benefits and decision making, 
in the strivings for participatory democracy, in resilience and 
adaptability, also have relevance in other arenas. These range from 
the academic or policy debates on the crisis in CBNRM in southern 
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Africa (see Section 2), on devolution in CBNRM, on the contested 
evolutions of democracy in Zimbabwe or the region and on wider 
issues of natural resource management and human livelihoods. 
The challenge for scholar-practitioners is to seek a way forward 
within the narratives and counter narratives of the field or academia. 
As noted by Mandizadza and Munyaka (2004) in an assessment of 
the ‘crisis in CBNRM’ narrative,
‘All the arguments … point to parts of the problem; it’s now time to 
start contributing to the solution … there is more that can be done 
to make it work.’
That encapsulates the core practical aim of this paper, which draws 
on over a month of field work in Mahenye in 2005 and the wide range 
of narrators and narratives that emerged. It is far less a forensic 
identification of the problems in Mahenye than an attempt to draw 
out the stories told by people of the ward (and outside) that might 
contribute to solutions.
It first introduces the frame of the research. Secondly, it places 
Mahenye in the national, regional and global context of CBNRM, 
with a particular emphasis on the political economy aspects of 
devolution, democracy and development in CBNRM. It identifies the 
broader national political context (particularly of the past five years) 
that has influenced new realities in governance, land, economics 
and natural resource management in Zimbabwe, and provides a 
brief review of the history of Mahenye from the early 1980s to the 
late 1990s. The third section examines the available factual evidence 
about developments in Mahenye from 2000–2004 along relatively 
conventional institutional, economic and devolutionary lines. The 
fourth section is the heart of the paper and attempts to tell the stories 
of Mahenye, primarily through the voices of local stakeholders (but 
also at district and national level), in which the present is put in the 
context of the past, different narratives of the current situation are 
presented and different scenarios for change are offered. The fifth 
section is a discussion of these narratives to pull together common 
threads and factors, and the sixth is a conclusion offering potential 
options for ‘the more that could be done to make it work’. 
1.2 Study methodology
This paper is based on interviews, primary research and secondary 
sources. Research in Mahenye was initiated by one of the authors 
who spent one month living in the ward in August 2005. He focused 
on familiarising himself with the day-to-day lifestyles, concerns, 
characters and aspirations of the people of Mahenye, holding both 
informal discussions and formal semi-structured interviews with 
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people living and working there. This was followed by a one-week 
visit by all the authors in October 2005, during which initial research 
was verified and further interviews and analysis undertaken. 
Wherever feasible, findings were also triangulated to ensure the 
credibility of the information shared by interviewees. Field level 
research was complemented by interviews with relevant government 
officials, politicians, donors, NGOs, academics and private sector 
representatives at both district and national level who are either 
currently (or formerly) involved in CAMPFIRE implementation, 
analysis and policy development. A detailed description of the 
methodology forms part of a doctoral dissertation of the first author 
and is available on request.
In total, over 100 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
over a four-month period. More than 50 of these were with people 
in Mahenye. Given the sensitivity of the information collected, the 
authors have withheld the names of most interviewees. In Mahenye 
a representative mix of people was interviewed. These included those 
who are currently and were formerly involved with the CAMPFIRE 
committee, traditional leaders and others in positions of authority, 
government employees (like teachers and health workers), employees 
of lodge and safari operators, private business people and subsistence 
farmers. 
The authors acknowledge that we, like previous researchers in 
Mahenye, have our personal or research biases. Two of us have some 
practitioner experience, one during the 1990s ‘ordered polity’ period 
in Zimbabwe, with personal involvement in CAMPFIRE institutional 
development activities in Mahenye in that era; and one in the more 
eclectic governance and pilot CBNRM evolutions of Mozambique. 
Of the three of us, one is a Zimbabwean, with the experience and 
insights gained by living through the recent complex years.    
The approach we adopted – letting others tell their stories rather 
than working with a pre-defined, structured academic agenda – was 
intentionally chosen to minimise bias. This approach forced us to 
hear, acknowledge and move some way towards understanding the 
complexity and nuanced interpretations of the situation than would 
otherwise have been possible. When specific facts or incidences were 
revealed within stories we made every effort to verify these, but we 
were just as interested in understanding why people perceived and 
interpreted events in particular ways, how these events had affected 
their lives and what mitigating action they planned.   
On a cautionary note, the detailed village level findings of this study 
cannot be generalised to all CAMPFIRE projects in Zimbabwe. 
However, we believe that our analysis of the implications this has 
for effective CAMPFIRE outcomes does have some lessons and policy 
implications for CBNRM, both in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. 
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2. Mahenye in Context
2.1 CBNRM – Regional/Global 
Since early 2000 there has been a growing perception in southern 
Africa and internationally that the well-known CBNRM initiatives of 
the region are in some form of crisis. The nature and extent of this 
crisis has been the subject of e-mail discussion groups, workshops, 
seminars, papers and books, but there appears to be little consensus 
as to whether CBNRM is indeed in crisis and, if so, what constitutes 
the crisis and how to address it (Hutton, Adams & Murombedzi 2006; 
Dzingirai & Breen 2005; Turner 2004; Murombedzi 2003; Murphree 
2001; Roe et al. 2000).  
Despite the variability, it is possible to identify areas where there is 
common agreement among analysts and practitioners that CBNRM is 
facing real challenges. Foremost among these is the consensus that 
lack of progress in devolving genuine authority to local communities 
is the greatest challenge currently facing CBNRM. CBNRM advocates 
and practitioners are in agreement that the overall success of CBNRM 
strategies relies on the transfer of power to local communities 
(devolution) and the development of representative and accountable 
local institutions2  but they also agree that there  has been relatively 
little progress in devolving powers (Ribot 2004; Murphree 2004; 
Murombedzi 2003; Jones & Murphree 2001). 
What has been witnessed instead is decentralisation to local 
government structures (Ribot 2002; Shackleton & Campbell 2001; 
Katerere 2001) with varying levels of democratic legitimacy or 
accountability. Murombedzi (2003) sums this up in noting that most 
CBNRM initiatives that characterise themselves as ‘devolved’ ‘reflect 
rhetoric more than substance’ and that in reality they continue 
to be ‘characterised by some continuation of substantive central 
government control and management over natural resources rather 
than a genuine shift in authority to local people’ (NACSO 2003).  As 
noted by Murphree (2000) the result is that CBNRM ‘has not been 
tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and rarely tried’.
This paper aims to explore this full devolution crisis by illustrating 
that CBNRM is an ongoing process intimately affected by the national 
and local political, social, economic and environmental context; and 
that fundamental to the unfolding of CBNRM initiatives are issues of 
power and politics. 
2.2 CAMPFIRE – National
Over the past 20 years the CAMPFIRE programme – like Zimbabwe 
itself – has seen dramatic fluctuations in its fortunes and in the way 
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in which it has been perceived. CAMPFIRE was initiated in the 1980s 
as a strategy for wildlife management developed by the Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Management. By the 1990s it was 
embraced as a holistic approach to environment and development, 
endorsed by the Government of Zimbabwe, local and international 
NGOs and drawn upon as a source of inspiration for natural resource 
management regionally (Fabricius & Kock 2004; Jones & Murphree 
2001; Western & Wright 1994). 
Since 2000 it has frequently been portrayed as the archetypal 
example of CBNRM in crisis (Dzingirai & Breen 2005; Katerere 2001). 
It has witnessed the growth, followed by the demise, of a coordinated, 
multi-skilled and expert group of institutions and individuals 
committed to the implementation of the programme, collectively 
known as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) (Rihoy & 
Maguranyanga, In press). It has grown from an initiative affecting 
two to three districts, to one in which 52 of the country’s 57 districts 
are involved (Child et al. 2003). During the period 1990–2003 it was 
the recipient of approximately US$30 million in donor funding from 
a variety of international donors (Balint & Mashinya, In press), all of 
which have now withdrawn, leaving the programme largely unfunded. 
It is now widely recognised that, in practice, CAMPFIRE has been 
a process of decentralisation of control to Rural District Councils 
(RDCs), rather than one of devolution to sub-district level semi-
autonomous institutions (Murombedzi 2003; Child et al. 2003; Bond 
2001; Mandondo 2000; Roe et al. 2000). Such ‘aborted devolution’ 
has been identified as the prime challenge for CAMPFIRE and is 
indicative of the need to move on to what Child (2004) calls ‘second-
generation CBNRM’ in which clear authority and responsibility over 
decision making on fiscal or authority issues is shifted to the smaller 
scale of producer communities, rather than partially through sectors 
of national or local government.
There has also been a growing chorus of voices raising a cautionary 
note about devolution as a panacea. Research from other countries 
in the region (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, In press; Shackleton et 
al. 2001), elsewhere in Zimbabwe (Balint & Mashinya, In press; 
Mandondo 2001) and globally (Ribot 2002, 2004), indicates that the 
development of local level resource management institutions that 
are not accountable to their constituents (such as those usurped by 
local elites) can be as serious an impediment to effective community 
management of natural resources as decentralised control through 
local government. An approach to devolution challenges that moves 
beyond the ‘full devolution’ focus or the observations of local elite 
distortions or the problems of accountability at the local level has 
emerged from CBNRM scholars over the past six years. This was 
propelled by a paper by Murphree (2000) that tackled interaction 
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between jurisdictional scales and institutions in natural resource 
governance. It pointed out that scaling down to be sustainable also 
requires scaling up. In this paper and elaborations on it (see Martin 
2003 and www.sasusg.net) the emphasis is that devolution is not an 
exercise in isolationism, but a process of finding local regime inter-
dependence within the larger setting of inter-dependence at many 
scales. The key elements of the ‘scaling down, scaling up’ approach 
are:
• The principle of delegated aggregation: Local jurisdictions 
delegate upwards aspects of their responsibility and authority 
to collective governance of larger scope (like RDCs) in which they 
continue to play a role.
• The principle of constituent accountability: Each institutional 
tier above the community level is accountable downwards to the 
constituency that empowered it. 
In the CAMPFIRE context the above perspective starts with the people 
of a ward, village or ‘producer community’ who delegate upwards to 
a CAMPFIRE committee, RDC or national government to effectively 
tackle jurisdictional, functional or ecological scale aspects; but who 
retain the right to accountability from this delegation of authority 
– whether by committee, chair of committee, local or traditional 
government, RDC or others. Devolution remains the ‘cardinal input’ 
(see Murphree & Mazambani 2002) but a hierarchy of institutions 
based on delegation from, and accountability to, the producer 
community provides the linkages and democratic governance process 
to resolve either local, district or national misappropriation of funds 
or power. If earlier phases of CAMPFIRE can be (over) simplified 
as emphasising economic instruments, sustainable use or local 
institutional development, the shift here can be characterised as 
moving to emphasise a process of practical democratic governance 
(or true federalism) with its focus on how authority should be 
delegated and accountable between scales. If CAMPFIRE in this 
context is fundamentally about experiments in and piloting of 
democratic governance, then it is firmly lodged in issues of national 
and local politics. It is this thread of politics, people and the levels at 
which they interact that runs through this paper and is returned to 
in the final sections.  
As of late 2005 there were some indications that RDCs were 
beginning to respond to demands from their local constituents for 
at least greater fiscal devolution. Guruve RDC is leading the way in 
this regard with the recent agreement that three wards within this 
district will receive funds directly from the safari operator rather 
than through the RDC as in the past (Taylor, pers. comm. 2005). 
Chipinge RDC has in the past enabled direct payments from lodges in 
Mahenye to the local CAMPFIRE Committee (MCC) and has indicated 
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willingness to facilitate direct payments from the safari operator to 
the MCC once the current problems of fund misuse are resolved 
(chief executive officer, Chipinge RDC, pers. comm. 2005). These 
moves are tentative steps towards greater devolution and appear 
to have been set in motion as a result of demands from the RDC’s 
local constituents. Five years ago, Chitsike (2000) identified similar 
strong demand for greater authority and rights at a sub-district level 
emerging in other communities around the country. 
The evolving situation of potentially greater downward account-
ability to Mahenye Ward by Chipinge RDC (or by Guruve RDC in its 
context) may well prove significant in determining the future direction 
of CAMPFIRE. Precedents are being established and new challenges 
of local scale governance and elite capture have emerged that suggest 
a need for upward delegation of certain functions (see also Rihoy & 
Maguranyanga, In press). The outcomes will have an impact for the 
future of CAMPFIRE and possibly in CBNRM initiatives elsewhere. 
2.3 National context 
As noted above, at least part of CAMPFIRE scholarship has moved 
on to place CBNRM centrally in the context of applied democratic 
governance, operating within a political as well as the conventionally 
more emphasised technocratic context. Therefore, unlike the work 
of Balint and Mashinya (In press), our research intentionally aims to 
explore the situation of CAMPFIRE in Mahenye within the broader 
politico-economic context of Zimbabwe. 
The country has undergone significant and far-reaching political, 
economic and social upheavals since the mid 1980s when CAMPFIRE 
was first introduced, and since 2000 has descended into one of crisis. 
Its relatively strong economy has been reduced to the weakest in 
the region (Hill 2005; Bauer & Taylor 2005). Once reasonably stable 
political conditions are now characterised by civil unrest and political 
repression; a previously well-functioning bureaucracy is in tatters, 
while respect for basic democratic principles, the rule of law and 
human rights are limited in their observation (Harold-Barry 2004; 
Hammar & Raftopoulos 2003). 
 Zimbabwe (once a darling of the international donor community) 
has become a pariah and has exhibited many of the attributes of 
‘disorder as a political instrument’ in which political actors and 
elites seek to maximise their returns on the state of confusion 
and uncertainty (Chabal & Daloz 1999). This decline has had 
significant impacts on many different elements of the CAMPFIRE 
programme, including the process of policy making, the economic 
benefits available from sustainable use, donor or private investment, 
governance arrangements and implementation capacities of both 
NGOs and government agencies. The following draws out some of 
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the economic, political, policy and civil society contexts that we 
believe are relevant to (and appear often reflected in) CAMPFIRE and 
evolutions in Mahenye. 
Economic status
The realisation of CAMPFIRE-related financial revenue and economic 
incentives is linked to macro-economic dynamics and whether these 
allow for continuation or improvements in revenue generation, 
encourage revenue ‘capture’ by RDCs and political economic elites 
or constrain opportunities for growth. The economic climate is 
equally important for generation of revenue through private sector 
participation, concession leases and investments in tourism. 
The negative macro-economic and political environment in the 
post-2000 period presents major challenges for the generation of 
CAMPFIRE revenue. Between 2000 and 2003 Zimbabwe’s GDP 
plummeted by 30% and the trend has continued; manufacturing has 
declined by 51% since 1997 and exports have fallen by half since 
2001 (Dell 2005). With an inflation rate of 1700%, Zimbabwe now has 
the highest rate of any country in the world (see www.zwnews.com). 
Dell (2005) estimates that the proportion of the population living 
below the official poverty line has more than doubled since the mid 
1990s, standing now at about 80%.
The political and economic turmoil has led to the collapse of 
the tourism sector. Nemarundwe (2005) highlights the negative 
impacts of this economic climate on CAMPFIRE. Its potential to 
generate income through tourism is affected, and community 
investment projects resulting from the programme are undermined 
as price fluctuations make a mockery of budgets. Hyperinflation 
also compromises the financial activities and economic viability 
of CAMPFIRE projects, erodes financial benefits and value, and, 
given the cycle in which payments of household cash dividends 
from CAMPFIRE revenue activities takes place six months to a year 
after activities have occurred, the loss of cash benefits to inflation 
is massive. Finally, in the absence of many other income or taxable 
options, the current situation is further increasing the RDC’s 
dependence on CAMPFIRE wildlife revenue for survival.
The current economic environment is thus extremely disruptive to 
CAMPFIRE. This is compounded further by urban-rural migration 
and increased pressures on the rural natural resource base resulting 
from the difficulties experienced by urban dwellers in securing 
employment (the estimated unemployment rate is 80%) and the 
attempted eviction of many urban dwellers in mid 2005. 
Political characteristics
The extreme economic and political problems that now face Zimbabwe 
can best be analysed and understood in the context of its history 
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(Raftopoulous 2004). Zimbabwe emerged from almost a century of 
white rule, following a long and violent liberation war that ended 
in 1980, fought largely over land. Since 1980 the political priorities 
of the government have been dominated by reversing decades of 
racially-biased inequalities in land, resource and asset distribution 
(Hammar & Raftopoulous 2004; Jones & Murphree 2001). As the 
ruling party slogan ‘the land is the economy, the economy is the land’ 
implies, struggles over land have been at centre stage throughout the 
colonial and post-colonial period. 
Since 2000 the mix of land and race has formed a volatile political 
cocktail dominating all aspects of economic, political and social 
life (Murombedzi & Gomera 2005). This struggle over land and its 
resources is central to understanding the political dimensions of 
natural resource management in Zimbabwe, and explaining why it 
receives such a high degree of political prominence. The politically 
charged environment in which natural resource management finds 
itself has significant implications for CAMPFIRE.  Wolmer et al. 
(2003) point out that wildlife management in general is viewed with 
suspicion as it was considered to be ‘a ploy of whites to forestall land 
acquisition and justifying multiple and extensive land holdings’.
By the 1990s it had become clear that the grand aims articulated 
by the state following independence had yet to be realised, and 
many of the significant gains of the reforms had slowed down or 
reversed. Poverty levels were increasing and new local governance 
arrangements were attracting criticism (Makumbe 1998).  By the 
late 1990s the political legitimacy of ZANU-PF was coming under 
increasing scrutiny, culminating in significant and escalating 
electoral challenges and civil unrest. The response on the part of the 
party-state was increased authoritarianism, violence and repression 
of political opposition, leading to the creation of a climate of fear and 
intolerance (Raftopoulous & Savage 2005) and a breakdown in the 
rule of law (Bauer & Taylor 2005; Hill 2005). 
Concerted efforts by the ruling party to consolidate rural support 
were undertaken, most significantly through the ‘fast track’ land 
reform process (Keeley & Scoones 2003) but also through the 
introduction of the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) in 2001. This 
restored legal powers and authority to chiefs (a shift from and 
unclear addition to the previous policy of democratically elected local 
governance at village and ward level) and is in essence a replica of 
colonial strategies towards the traditional leadership with the effect of 
co-opting the traditional leadership to ensure political penetration of 
the state and ruling party into rural landscapes. 
In broad political terms, Zimbabwe can no longer be described as 
an ordered political polity (Chabal & Daloz 1999) in which political 
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opportunities and resources are defined explicitly and codified by 
legislation or precedent. Of relevance to the latter discussion on 
politics in Mahenye CAMPFIRE, a further national feature is one of 
persistent political stalemate, whether internally between parties in 
Zimbabwe or in relation to regional or international efforts to facilitate 
political compromise or consensus to address the economic and 
humanitarian crisis.   
Civil society 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Zimbabwe witnessed the growth 
of NGOs and a strong and vibrant civil society. NGOs received 
generous support from donors and worked to support government 
programmes. CAMPFIRE exemplified this (Duffy 2000) and the 
CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), a joint facilitating structure 
of both government agencies, NGOs and academic institutions, 
played a key role in implementation until 2000 (Rihoy & 
Maguranyanga, In press; Child et al. 2003). However, the shift in the 
political landscape of Zimbabwe immediately prior to 2000 resulted 
in major opposition by civil society organisations to a government-led 
constitutional amendment. From 1999, some segments of civil society 
began to challenge the government on land, electoral and human 
rights issues. This challenge was treated as a sign of political defiance 
warranting the repression of NGOs, and the government introduced 
the 2005 NGO Bill which considerably curtailed NGO functions and 
independence. This volatile political climate translated into a difficult 
operational environment for civil society, particularly in any area of 
governance and in involvement in rural development (Raftopoulous 
& Savage 2005; Bauer & Taylor 2005). 
The impact of this marginalisation of civil society on CAMPFIRE 
has been profound. Members of the CCG formerly played a key role 
in capacity building at grass-roots level (Child et al. 2003). Members 
of the CCG also fulfilled a critical role as ‘honest brokers’, providing 
neutral arbitration in instances where community-level polarisation 
stalled progress in programme implementation. As of 2003, 
because of the political backlash against civil society, NGOs have 
been prevented from playing any significant role in implementing 
CAMPFIRE (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, In press). Compounding this 
implementation marginalisation has been the loss of access to 
funding that has been experienced by NGOs throughout Zimbabwe 
as a result of donor withdrawal arising from the political situation. 
Policy context
While there are legitimate criticisms of the environmental policy-
making process in Zimbabwe prior to 2000 (Scoones & Keeley 2003; 
Mandondo 2000), the country did have a relatively well-functioning 
and effective bureaucracy (Hill 2005). After 2000 the situation 
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changed dramatically, as described to us by one former senior 
government official: 
‘Since the turmoil started in about 2000, Zimbabwe’s bureaucracy 
hasn’t functioned because it wasn’t clear who was in charge, or 
where power lay. Bureaucrats were unable to function because 
we were unsure who we would have to answer to or who we 
would offend in the process. The result was that no one made any 
decisions or took any actions.’   
Once again, this has had a profound effect on CAMPFIRE. CAMPFIRE 
is based upon principles of sustainable use (SASUSG 1995). The 
discourse upon which sustainable use is based has solid scientific 
and rational underpinnings. It is primarily a technical exercise, with 
the goal of economic productivity lying at its heart. Successful wildlife 
management relies on its ability to produce marketable surpluses 
while maintaining the resource base. The resulting implementation 
approach assigned key regulatory and monitoring functions to 
technical arms of the state, in the form of the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Management, now known as the 
Wildlife Management Authority (WMA), to ensure environmental 
sustainability. However, the scientific approach that formerly drove 
policy making has now been replaced by a racially charged and 
politically biased populist moral discourse about ‘the return of 
African soil to Africans’ adopted by the ruling party. The clearest 
example of this is in the government’s revitalisation of the land 
reform process under the fast-track approach, which pushed aside 
many of the standard planning approaches in favour of the populist 
mobilisation of ‘land invaders’ (Scoones & Keeley 2003), an aim of 
which was to boost the ruling party’s waning popularity. 
The result of this radical shift in how policy is developed and 
implemented in the wildlife management context is that the WMA’s 
ability to regulate and monitor resource use and provide programme 
oversight has largely been undermined, as to do so could lead to 
retribution from powerful political forces. The leading role that 
powerful ruling party politicians have assumed within the wildlife 
management industry in Zimbabwe (a major source of rare foreign 
exchange) has recently been the subject of national and international 
media coverage (see Hammer 2006). As noted by Gibson (1999) 
from observations of wildlife resources in post-independent Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, the increasing central government and 
political elites control of wildlife has become
‘…another source of goods which an incumbent party could 
distribute …. Political actors in all three countries regarded the 
primary benefits of wildlife policy to be distributive goods and not 
the collective good of conservation’.
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2.4 Mahenye: description, history, people and CBNRM evolutions,  
1982–2000 
Environmental characteristics
Mahenye Ward is located at the southern end of Chipinge District, 
bordered on the east by Mozambique, to the west and south by 
Gonarezhou National Park and Chiredzi District, and to the north 
by Mutandahwe Ward, also in Chipinge District. It has a low average 
rainfall of 450–500 mm supporting dry land cultivation of grains only 
in good seasons, but its relatively low population density – 20 people/
km or half the district average – has ensured that the lowveld habitat 
has remained relatively intact (CSO 1992; Booth 1991). 
Historical context
The historical background of the ward has been extensively traced 
and documented (Child 1995; Murphree1995; Zimbabwe Trust 1991; 
Peterson 1991; Stockil 1987). The following account is compiled 
from these sources. The population of Mahenye is from the minority 
Shangaan ethnic group, for whom hunting was traditionally a major 
component of their livelihood strategies. Their culture had evolved 
well-defined regulatory practices to make off-takes sustainable. 
Many of the current inhabitants of Mahenye were evicted 
from their traditional lands prior and up to 1966 as these areas 
became incorporated into the Gonarezhou National Park. Following 
independence in 1980, strong hopes that their land would be 
returned to them were dashed when the new government indicated 
that its priority was to gain the foreign exchange brought into 
the country by tourists and the national park. This resulted in 
heightened resentment towards Gonarezhou and wildlife, manifested 
as increasing incidences of illegal resource use as people sought 
illicit ways in which to assert their traditional resource rights and 
livelihoods.  
In the mid 1980s an informal agreement between the Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM), a local safari 
operator and the people of Mahenye enabled some of the benefits 
from elephant hunting in the area to be returned to the villagers. 
After long negotiations and having overcome many bureaucratic 
hurdles, DNPWM eventually agreed to build a school and grinding 
mill in 1987, drawing on these hunting revenues. 
Throughout the early negotiations, all those who have traced 
this history note that the people of Mahenye showed remarkable 
social cohesiveness, patience and restraint in the face of a slow and 
bureaucratic decision-making process. 
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Socio-political characteristics
Murphree (2001) notes that Mahenye’s geographic position has 
contributed to its isolation. Neighbours to the east are in a different 
country; to the south is a national park, while those in the west are 
in a different province. Thus Mahenye retains administrative isolation 
from those in its immediate vicinity. Perhaps most significantly is that 
within Chipinge District itself, the people of Mahenye are ethnically 
discrete as they are the only Shangaan-speaking people in a district 
otherwise made up exclusively of the Shona-Ndau ethnic group. 
The people of Mahenye are culturally, politically and 
administratively distinct from their neighbours, which Murphree 
(2001) concludes led to the development of a strong level of intra-
communal cohesiveness – then largely manifested around the 
institution and individual occupying the role of chief – and a sense 
of collective communal interest. 
Legal status and institutional basis for CBNRM
The granting of Appropriate Authority (AA) status to Gazaland 
District Council (now Chipinge RDC) in 1991 provided the legal 
mechanism through which the people of Mahenye were able to 
benefit from natural resource management activities in their ward.  
In order to ensure effective management of the resource base and an 
accountable and representative local level management structure, the 
Mahenye CAMPFIRE Committee (MCC) was established in the late 
1980s. 
The operations of the MCC are governed by bylaws (commonly 
referred to as ‘the constitution’) which were developed following 
lengthy consultations with the general community, traditional 
leadership and local CAMPFIRE leadership (Silas Makanza of 
Zimbabwe Trust, pers. comm. 2005) and are still frequently referred 
to in CAMPFIRE discussions today. While neither the MCC institution 
nor the bylaws have formal legal status they are (or were) strongly 
legitimised by use, precedent and acceptance by the various 
CAMPFIRE-related bodies. These bylaws outline the objectives of 
the institution, the roles, responsibilities and terms of the office 
bearers and general members, and stipulate means through which 
accountability to the broader membership are to be assured. They 
include:
• The holding of regular annual general meetings (AGMs) 
for transparent disclosure of management and financial 
activities by the MCC post holders to the community.
• The holding of annual elections (via secret ballot by Mahenye 
households) for post holders in the Mahenye CAMPFIRE 
Committee (MCC) such as that of chairman, vice-chairman, 
finance manager and others.
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The bylaws are a written, widely known and understood 
representation of the standard to which the MCC should adhere. 
They represent an important benchmark against which to measure 
and exert accountability for the activities of the MCC, its post holders 
and the operation of CAMPFIRE at the producer community scales 
(‘downward constituent accountability’ in the context of Murphree 
2000, discussed previously).
The institutional linkages and networks between authorities and 
across jurisdictional and functional scales were also well developed 
over this period and broadly followed the principles of upward 
delegation to tackle functional needs with downward accountability. 
During the early 1980s the primary decision-making institutions 
in the ward were those of the traditional authority (through the 
leadership of chiefs, headmen and sabhukus)  working in a closely 
coordinated relationship with those of the democratically elected 
‘modern’ political and development institutions structures such 
as the Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) to the higher 
scale of the Rural District Councils. In the 1990s, by virtue of 
its elected basis and development importance locally, the MCC 
also became a powerful institution. The private sector, originally 
represented by one individual (who had also facilitated early 
CBNRM evolutions in the ward between the various bodies) also had 
significant influence (Murphree 2001). Strong linkages between the 
MCC and national players’ network in capacity building, ‘honest 
brokering’ and technical wildlife management advice existed with 
NGOs (WWF, Zimbabwe Trust, CASS-University of Zimbabwe), the 
national CAMPFIRE representative and advocacy body (CAMPFIRE 
Association) and the state wildlife sector (DNPWM).  
Economic basis of CAMPFIRE in Mahenye
One of Mahenye’s progressive attributes during this period, compared 
to most CAMPFIRE wards, was its diversification in revenue from 
solely sport hunting incomes to joint enterprises in the eco-tourism 
sector. In the early 1990s the RDC, on behalf of the people of 
Mahenye, entered into a joint venture arrangement with a private 
tourist operator, the Zimbabwe Sun (now Rivers Lodges of Africa) 
for the construction of two lodges – Mahenye Safari Lodge and Chilo 
Lodge – catering to a high paying tourist market for game viewing 
and photographic safaris largely benefiting from easy access to the 
nearby national park. Under the terms of the 1996 agreement, land 
was leased from the RDC for a 10-year period. The lodge operator was 
paying 8% of gross revenue for the first three years, 10% for the next 
three years and 12% for the final four years. Initially revenue earned 
was paid via the RDC, but in 2003/4 a more direct allocation was 
made to the MCC. In principle this represented a significant step in 
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fiscal devolution (albeit if undertaken in an informal way) but was a 
decision subsequently reversed at the request of the RDC.  
The income potential from these lodges was considerable from 
the mid 1990s and by 1997 generated twice the income of sport 
hunting and was responsible for more than tripling the overall 
income for Mahenye CAMPFIRE between 1994 and 1997 (Murphree 
2001), yet the downturn in tourism in Zimbabwe since 2000 has 
meant that the real financial returns have become limited and sport 
hunting has returned as the largest revenue source. Despite this, 
the lodges have still brought considerable benefits, most notably 
in the form of employment. Currently, out of a total of 37 staff 
employed, 32 are from Mahenye, including one in a management 
position. The construction of the lodges has also led to improved 
local infrastructure such as transport links, electrification, bore-hole 
construction and telephone connections.  
For much of the 1990s and since 2000 the primary form of income 
generation for the MCC has been from the safari hunting concession 
in the Mahenye/Mutandahwe area. CAMPFIRE revenue in the period 
1992–1997 from sport hunting was around US$15-20,000 (largely 
from elephant hunting) with the total revenues achieved in the late 
1990s from both hunting and lodge tourism reaching around US$ 
40,000 (Murphree 2001). On average in this period the allocations 
from total revenue to household dividends were consistently around 
50%, with around 20% allocated for RDC administration costs 
(essentially a tax)3, 2% for the CAMPFIRE Association and the rest 
roughly shared between MCC managed development projects (such 
as grinding mills) and wildlife management costs (drawing on data 
in Murphree 2001). 
The household dividends of about US$15-25 were significant in 
comparison to other CAMPFIRE areas (median of US$4.49 – see Bond 
2001) and an important incentive for driving CAMPFIRE institutional 
change and supporting local household incomes. A number of 
interviewees in this current research had vivid memories of the cash 
dividends of the late 1990s as being key contributions to the family’s 
ability to purchase goods and food in drought years or enable the 
payment of school fees.
Overview
In summary, the evolutions of CBNRM institutions and economic 
arrangements during the period of two decades largely concurred 
by the late 1990s in practice (if not formal legal arrangements) 
with devolutionary principles. Namely, the MCC as a transparent, 
democratically elected body with considerable if not fully devolved 
authority and a clear accountability to a constituency of local 
members. In addition, there was evidence of the equally important 
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dynamics noted by Murphree (2000) for CBNRM of linkages and 
delegated functions upwards from the producer community MCC 
scale to those scales and entities at district, national agency, NGO 
and private sector. If Mahenye Ward had been a precursor to the 
core values of devolution in CAMPFIRE, it could by the late 1990s 
also be characterised as a precursor to, and example for, the further 
evolutions of scholarship of the ‘beyond devolution’ views (Rihoy 
& Maguranyanga, In press) and to more nuanced recognitions of 
practical democratic politics in CBNRM through crucial upward 
linkages and networks between scales and institutions based on 
delegation and accountability. 
It is worth stressing that this resulted from a happy congruence 
of a number of disparate factors. These included local level features 
(such as strong leadership in local institutions, whether MCC or 
traditional authority); the incentive drive from the economic success 
of Mahenye CBNRM that reinforced political investment and support 
by the RDC or economic partnership with the private sector; and a 
wider framework built from an ‘ordered polity’ political and economic 
environment that drew favourable reaction from state agencies, and 
a supportive NGO network. The background to how such positive, 
reinforcing dynamics could apparently reverse into stalemate, with 
the benefits of devolution being questioned – not least by the people 
of Mahenye – is examined in the next section.
3.  Mahenye 2000–2005: Institutions and Economic 
Incentives 
3.1  Institutions, management and local governance
Since 2000 there have been significant shifts of power within and 
between institutions in Mahenye, as well as the major shifts in 
macro-economic and national political context noted earlier and 
returned to in section 5.1.  One outcome of these shifts has been 
the dramatic demise of CAMPFIRE in the view of the overwhelming 
majority of local inhabitants interviewed, and summed up as follows 
by one woman:
‘CAMPFIRE used to be for all the people, now it’s a family 
business.’
The demise of CAMPFIRE in Mahenye, its core local institution 
(the MCC) and dramatic falls in the value of household dividends 
coincides with and has been strongly influenced by four related local 
events:
• the death of the highly respected old Chief Mahenye in 2001 and 
replacement by his son, the current chief
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• the complete change of MCC office bearers (on the explicit 
instructions of the new chief), following the flawed MCC elections 
of 2001, including the appointment (not election) of the chief’s 
younger brother as chairman
• the election of a new councillor for the ward
• the re-tendering of  the hunting concession which has led 
to ongoing conflict and the widespread belief among most 
local stakeholders that the operators currently bidding for 
the concession are blatantly competing among each other in 
their attempts to illicitly ‘buy off’ the chief and MCC to ensure 
preferential treatment. 
These changes have effectively removed the strong local leadership 
whose commitment and accountability were (Murphree 2001) 
formerly such a distinctive feature of Mahenye. These included the 
chief, headmen and respected elders, the school headmaster and 
other teachers and an elected leadership including the councillor and 
members of the MCC. Collectively, these people provided a leadership 
structure that was balanced in its sources of traditional and popular 
legitimation. 
Local power and authority has shifted away from the delicate 
balance established between traditional and elected democratic 
institutions and the leadership of these structures, and has become 
concentrated into the hands of core local elite focused around the 
traditional leadership. ‘Honest brokers’ in local dynamics whether 
of the private sector, NGO, state, RDC or other have become rare, 
ineffectual or sidelined. As many people in Mahenye said, the result 
is that they now have their own ‘dictator’. The important point in 
the following discussion is the premise that it is not the institution 
(rules of the game) of either the MCC or customary authority that 
are causal, but the distortion of the rules of both by particular forces 
since 2000 that have permitted local elite capture and perpetuated 
stalemate, contrary to the delegation and accountability mechanisms 
that existed in the past. It is this stalemate, distortions to institutions 
and the ‘particular forces’ that have led to this that are at the core of 
many of the narratives from Mahenye in the next section.    
Management of CAMPFIRE in 2005
The effect on CAMPFIRE of the shifts in the balance of power between 
institutions and distortion of the rules within institutions has been 
dramatic. The MCC, once viewed by the Mahenye people with pride 
as contributing to the overall development of Mahenye and to the 
livelihood needs of individual families, is now widely perceived as 
an institution that mismanages and abuses CAMPFIRE community 
funds for the personal enrichment of the chief and his clan. This 
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has included the use of project vehicles for personal transport, the 
privatisation of the general store, grinding mills and other CAMPFIRE 
projects, and access to scarce employment opportunities at the 
lodges being mediated by the chief’s family. Enabling this situation 
has been the dismantling of those locally developed and mandated 
mechanisms that ensured that CAMPFIRE was a participatory 
process, representative of and accountable to the people of Mahenye. 
The demise of democratic procedures 
Although it has no formal legal basis, the MCC is, according 
to its constitution, responsible for carrying out management 
functions, employing local staff to monitor wildlife, poaching and 
hunting activities of the professional hunter. It sets budgets and 
is responsible to general community meetings for its activities and 
planning. Prior to 2000 MCC board members were democratically 
and transparently elected (once every two years) at open AGMs, and 
presentation of incomes and budgets openly made with all decisions 
regarding use of revenues collectively taken at these meetings. 
But only two AGMs have been held since 2000, both of which 
were poorly attended4. Elections for committee members have not 
been held at any AGM since those of 2001. The current chairman 
was never elected but was given this position by the chief after his 
predecessor (who had been elected in the 2001 elections) left the 
village after allegedly misappropriating CAMPFIRE funds.  
On the rare occasion when AGMs are still held, their function 
is now very different from the accountability basis outlined in the 
constitution. According to the MCC chairman himself,
‘…we use AGMs as a way to tell the community how the 
committee and traditional leaders have budgeted and spent 
CAMPFIRE money and other things. It’s where we let them know 
what their leaders are doing for them.’
Regular monthly planning meetings of the MCC are still held, known 
as ‘First Friday’ meetings. The original committee of seven has been 
expanded to 12. In addition to MCC members, these meetings are 
now also open to all members of the traditional leadership, the 
councillor and the ward coordinator, totalling 44 people. Minutes 
of the meetings for the years 2004/5 illustrate that discussions are 
dominated by issues relating to the selection of the safari operator 
and what is perceived to be the undue influence of the RDC in the 
process.  Moreover, it is at these meetings that ‘elections’ are now 
undertaken for new membership of the MCC, with candidates for 
membership nominated exclusively by existing MCC members, 
normally the chairman. Income and budget transparency to the 
household level has evaporated – as revealed in the quote from the 
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chairman, the mentality of the leadership5 is not based around 
collective decision making by/with the people or accounting for 
actions and decisions (active and interactive) but informing the people 
(whose role is passive).
3.2  Shrinking incomes and economic incentives 
Balint and Mashinya (In press) maintain that ‘on the economic front, 
the project’s two primary sources of income, hunting revenue and 
lodge receipts, are both to some degree buffered against external 
shocks’ and conclude that the significant reductions in the economic 
incentives currently being offered by CAMPFIRE arise primarily from 
local level mismanagement and corruption. 
While our own research confirms that significant funds are being 
lost as a result of local level problems, it also indicates that the higher 
‘leakages’ are occurring in a chain of transactions with a cumulative 
erosion of revenue prior to household dividend payments. The major 
leakages come from national economic distortions. Primarily, these 
losses result from
• the loss in value that occurs when converting foreign exchange to 
the massively over-valued Zimbabwe $ (which can result in loss of 
up to half the value)
• the loss in value resulting from annual inflation rates as high as 
1700% when revenue remains stored in bank accounts for up to 
a  year before household dividend payments are made. 
This has very significant implications for CAMPFIRE, implying that 
the cash-based approach upon which it has traditionally relied to 
provide the economic incentive for resource management is of limited 
viability in the current economic context of Zimbabwe.  Table 1 
illustrates the dramatic declines in individual household revenues 
from 1996–2004, as well as the decline in funds allocated from overall 
revenue to household dividend. 
Throughout the 1990s, annual allocations to household dividends 
were consistently around 50% of total budget, ranging from 48% in 
1992 to 55% in 1997 (Murphree 2001).  Since 2001 there has only 
been one allocation to household dividends. This took place in May 
2004 and was on the basis (according to the official figures submitted 
by Chipinge RDC letter on 23/11/04) of a total revenue earned 
(2003) of Z$40,118,791.6 The household dividend amounted to a 
cash payment (in principle) of Z$6,100 per household. But Z$6,000 
was deducted from each household prior to payouts, for a ‘district 
development levy’ by the traditional authority, the validity of which 
has never been verified, resulting in an actual cash in hand dividend 
of just Z$100 (US$0.03). As stated by one interviewee: 
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‘Z$100 even then wasn’t enough to buy one match, and most 
didn’t know about it. I don’t know anyone who even went to the 
[MCC project] office to collect their money.’
As a proportion of the overall stated revenues, this sum of ‘actual 
cash in hand’ dividend represented less than 1% (0.2%) compared 
to the 50% averages in the 1990s.7 Meanwhile, those who attend 
the monthly MCC meetings get a sitting allowance of Z$15,000 per 
session, refreshments and transport. As the MCC meetings are 
potentially open to the 44 people as detailed above, total annual costs 
of these can in theory exceed Z$13,200,000, plus transport. This is in 
stark contrast to the total dividend payout in 2004 of Z$5,453,400.
The situation relating to income and budgets in 2004/5 is highly 
complicated not only by the state of the internal MCC accounts 
reviewed during this research, but by the payments from the lodges 
and hunting sectors bypassing a central revenue record system at 
either MCC or RDC level and with unclear contractual or financial 
agreements. 
The most lucrative source of income has been sport hunting and 
this has been mired in complexity. In 1997 Tshabezi Safaris won the 
concession for a five-year period. In 2002 the hunting concession 
was tendered again and once again awarded by the RDC to Tshabezi 
Safaris. The fact that no contract has been in place since 2002 is one 
of the causes of the conflict surrounding the hunting concession. 
During this tender process disputes have broken out which are 
still ongoing between and within various interest groups within the 
community of Mahenye, with the RDC, and between three competing 
private sector operators. As of late 2005 the formal contract had still 
1996 1997 2004






Proportion of overall revenues 
allocated to HH dividends
50% 55% 0.2% (14%)^
* The actual HH dividend received by people was Z$100 (US$0.03) after an unclear local ‘tax’ of 
Z$6,000 was deducted prior to payouts. 
^ In proportion of overall revenues allocated to HH dividends the percentage prior to the’ tax’ was 
+/- 14%. The actual cash dividends for the household totalled Z$89,400 (894 HH x Z$100) which 
represents only 0.2% of the Z$40,118,791 noted as total revenues by the RDC records.
Source: 2004 – this research and 1990s data adapted from Murphree (2001).
Exchange rates based on Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe data.
Table 1 Household dividend payments and proportion of overall revenue, 
1990s and 2004
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to be awarded. The resulting uncertainties and competition between 
the various stakeholders has been one of the driving forces enabling 
a powerful local level elite to co-opt the power and resources of the 
MCC for their own political and personal financial ends. As a mirror 
of national power and politics, the local elite situation appears to 
be an ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ (Chabal & Daloz 1999) in 
which this elite, by serving as community and lucrative resource 
gatekeeper, ‘vanguard’ leadership with powerful political capital and 
connections, can maximise its access to benefits through disorder. 
By maintaining disorder and their gatekeeper status, the local elite 
is successfully playing off the private sector members against each 
other, monopolising the considerable benefits of patronage and 
ensuring that the rules of the game (clear contracts and transparent 
payments) remain sufficiently obscure to prolong a stalemate.    
Whatever the accounting and contractual complexity, the simple 
facts are that the households in Mahenye are getting no meaningful 
economic dividends from CAMPFIRE, in stark contrast to the 
1990s. The widely held belief in Mahenye of corruption, misuse 
and abuse of funds and power by the MCC resulted in a written 
request from the Mahenye ward councillor to the RDC requesting 
an internal audit, which was carried out in April, 2004. This audit 
demonstrates that the picture (also observed in Balint & Mashinya, 
In press), concerning abuse of funds, infrastructure, equipment and 
employment opportunities by those who now control CAMPFIRE is 
clearly grounded in fact. The report, which as of September 2005 had 
not been made available to the public, concludes:
‘The marginalised communities are not benefiting as much from 
the projects and it is apparent that the privileged few now stand 
to benefit. Recommended systems and procedures have been 
ignored, most likely deliberately.’
The outcome of this situation is that all of those interviewed noted 
that there is no longer any independent local institution that 
represents the interests of the people or to which the grievances of 
the people can be aired. All discussions and decisions now take place 
at the chief’s dare (assembly meeting). 
This is the background of radically changed institutions, local 
governance and politics and economic incentives against which the 
following section of narratives is set. 
4. Stakeholder Narratives
‘Vanhu varwadziwa, havana kwavanochemera’ 
– People are not happy, but they don’t know where to complain
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4.1 Background
Given the competing interests at stake it is perhaps not surprising 
that the narratives surrounding CAMPFIRE in Mahenye differ among 
the various stakeholders, and that different scenarios for change 
are identified by these groups. In very broad terms the stakeholder 
groups at a local level can be identified as 
• traditional leadership and current MCC members 
• general community members 
• the private sector 
Other external stakeholders include the RDCs and NGOs such as 
the CAMPFIRE Association. However, as the following discussion 
indicates, this simplistic breakdown of players hides an overlapping 
and constantly shifting array of perceptions, alliances and networks. 
This section relates the stories that each group shared with us, 
highlighting the concerns and issues dominant within each group. 
Wherever possible they are presented in their own words.  
4.2  Traditional leadership
The traditional leadership in Mahenye consists of Chief Mahenye, 
two headmen and 29 kraal heads. Given the co-option of the MCC 
by the chief and his immediate family (as of September 2005 every 
member of the 12-person MCC was a relative of the chief) we identify 
these institutions here as falling within the same stakeholder group 
even though there are very clear ‘fault lines’ developing between 
individuals and sub-groups.8 Despite this close association of the 
chief with the programme, he claims to have no direct relationship 
with it, although he is outspoken in his support, noting that:
‘CAMPFIRE has been here a long time and brought many good 
things but it needs changes. The main problem is that money from 
hunting goes to the RDC first; it should come directly to Mahenye. 
Also, the RDC want to interfere in who we select as our hunter.’
The narrative constructed by both the chief and the MCC chairman 
is one of a successful programme that has brought development to 
Mahenye while protecting the natural resource base and upholding 
local culture and traditions. They identify some problems with the 
programme but attribute them to external agents and technical 
deficiencies in the implementation process; what they portray as the 
greed and inefficiency of the current safari operator, coupled with 
the unwillingness of the RDC to commit to fiscal devolution and local 
level decision making regarding the selection of safari operators. 
They acknowledge that there have been problems with financial 
accountability in the recent past but are confident that they have now 
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put mechanisms in place to address these, in the form of a finance 
sub-committee of the MCC. 
However, with the exception of these two individuals, the eight  
other members of the traditional leadership and MCC interviewed 
(including the person responsible for financial accounting and 
record keeping) presented a less rosy story by identifying failures in 
leadership, financial management  and governance – and detailing 
several instances of abuse and misuse of funds and MCC assets 
by the chairman – coupled with the technical and administrative 
problems identified by the chief and chairman as being the most 
significant  impediment to the programme. A senior member of the 
Chauke family said,
'The situation at the moment is a free-for-all. Soft drinks, sitting 
allowances, free transport, Christmas parties, nothing like before 
when things were run properly. It is corruption and bribery 
(undyire). But those of us with the authority to do something can’t 
because this dispute is in our own clan. Does a son question his 
father? Someone from outside must step in, either the RDC or 
CAMPFIRE Association. We made sure an auditor came but now 
the council (RDC) do nothing, they must remove the culprit, even 
make arrests. Council is letting us down.’ 
Reinforcing this accusation were the voices of two members of the 
newly established finance sub-committee who noted that ‘they are 
still hiding the books’ as they were prevented from overseeing or 
having any control of the finances. Demanding access to information 
was not an option as this would simply result in their removal from 
the committee and possible expulsion from the area. The general 
sentiment of anger and resentment against the chairman was further 
articulated by the ward councillor who is generally perceived to be 
working in collaboration with the chairman, despite the fact that it 
was he who requested the RDC audit. He independently echoed the 
sentiments expressed above commenting that:
‘The problems are the fault of the chairman, who overrides the 
financial committee. The people are unhappy and the problems 
are getting worse. If funds come direct here now they will just be 
stolen. If there is an election today the chairman and committee 
will be thrown out, people here know the problems and their 
rights.’  
4.3 General population
Of the 52 people interviewed in Mahenye, 32 can be broadly referred 
to as ‘general population’ in the sense that they did not belong to 
the other stakeholder groups. However, this hides a diverse mix of 
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individuals. Those interviewed were roughly representative in terms 
of age, ethnicity and gender and included teachers, clinic staff, former 
MCC members, Wildlife Management Authority staff, lodge employees 
and general store owners. However, the majority of those interviewed 
were subsistence farmers.
The story told by everyone in this group had at its centre 
disappointment and disillusionment with the current situation, but 
also a sense that events were still unfolding and that they collectively 
had at their disposal means to address the current problems. This 
group unanimously identified poor leadership, governance issues 
and the misappropriation of power by the MCC as the root cause of 
their problems, but there was also concern and confusion articulated 
about the private sector tourism operations, the role of NGOs and the 
role of the RDC. 
For over 10 years CAMPFIRE was portrayed to us as a source of 
local pride and confidence as well as development. It was considered 
to have been a genuinely representative process. The majority of 
ward residents had considerable information concerning the nature 
and extent of their rights, technical details (for example, the value of 
individual species) and the nature of income-generating ventures in 
their area, in which they enthusiastically participated and benefited. 
People articulated trust in and respect for their leaders at that 
time, crediting them with having brought about this success. On 
many occasions they specifically mentioned the former chief, former 
councillor, former MCC members, the private sector partner and 
NGOs formerly active in the area. There is universal agreement over 
the cause of the problem: 
‘Our troubles started when the old chief passed and [the former 
MCC chairman] and the others were pushed off the committee and 
[the current incumbent] was made chairman for life.’
But they are constrained to act because: 
‘People fear to challenge the chairman. This is challenging the 
chief and would result in losing land or even being chased from 
the area.’
A widely anticipated outcome of this is that:
‘People will go back to poaching because there’s no benefit from 
wildlife otherwise.’ 
There is also a common view that:
‘The RDC has more power, they should do something.’
There is little that people can do overtly, but they do have covert 
means of expressing their displeasure and translating this into 
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political statements. Identical versions of the following story were 
recounted by several different interviewees: 
‘The chief had been told by the District Administrator that 
everyone must vote ZANU and then he would get a vehicle. We 
were told to do so, but everyone here voted MDC to get back at 
him. He couldn’t do anything about that because it was a secret 
ballot. We hoped that the chief wouldn’t get his vehicle and realise 
that everyone was aware that he was allowing our CAMPFIRE 
money to be lost.’
Thus there is a remarkable level of agreement among the majority 
of those in Mahenye on the basic situation and how it should be 
resolved. However, beyond this common understanding there is 
the complication of ongoing conflict between the MCC, the safari 
operators and the RDC over the re-tendering of the hunting quota. 
There is a strong perception among the community members that 
this conflict is being used by the MCC as a smoke-screen to cover 
its own misconduct. 
Some in the community do not trust the current sport hunting 
operator, Tshabezi Safaris, who is blamed for failing to conduct 
problem animal control (PAC) and for failing to maximise returns on 
the quota, thus reducing the revenue for Mahenye. However, others 
are aware that the MCC negotiated with Tshabezi directly to ensure 
that a proportion of payments were made in kind to avoid payment 
passing through the RDC. These ‘in kind’ payments amounted to 
Z$42,109,360.22; almost the same amount as that paid via the RDC 
for the concession in the period 2002–2004 (Commission of Inquiry 
report 2005).
The MCC chairman maintains that this benefited the community 
as the 35% administration fee for Council was not subtracted. 
However, it is the common local belief (upheld by the RDC audit, 
research by Balint & Mashinya, In press, and our own) that those 
funds and assets that went directly to the MCC, such as vehicles, 
donations for the general store, materials for bridge construction 
and monies for school uniforms, have been misappropriated by the 
chairman. It was also commonly alleged that a rival operator, who 
is currently tendering for the Mahenye concession, was bribing the 
leadership with money, meat, beer and the construction of a house 
for the chief, in an attempt to favour the bid.10 
Private operators in the area are not trusted, despite the fact that 
many believe that the MCC is manipulating them to its own 
advantage. This lack of trust is compounded by the fact that the MCC 
chairman is employed by the lodges as their community liaison 
officer.
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‘If you want to get a job at Chilo [the lodges] or even Tshabezi as a 
housekeeper, you have to see the chairman and you will be made 
to pay a goat or some money.’ 
The positive relationships with the operator of the lodges, identified 
by Murphree (2001) and many people in Mahenye, have, at least for 
most interviewees, now broken down:
‘He’s no longer an honest broker, just another operator out 
to make sure he benefits at the expense of the people. He 
doesn’t know what happens here, he talks only to the chief 
and chairman.’
This belief is fuelled by the perception that the decreasing 
financial returns from the lodges are a result of attempts on their 
management’s behalf to defraud the community.11
Despite large-scale disillusionment with the situation, the majority 
of interviewees identified a core strategy to solve their problem. This 
strategy involves appeals to the RDC as the only institution with the 
legal and political authority, legitimacy and mandate to intervene 
and assist in the restoration of local institutional structures that are 
accountable and representative of the local constituency. Thus the 
collective demand is for the RDC to accept its responsibilities as the 
agency granted appropriate authority (AA) and act accordingly to 
ensure that the ‘CAMPFIRE constitution’ (established and secured 
by precedent bylaws of the MCC) and democratic functioning local 
institutions (the MCC under the rules of the bylaws) are in place. 
Essentially, the action demanded is that elections should be held for 
the posts of the MCC – under the secret ballot and transparent rules 
of the existing bylaws – after four years of these basic rules having 
been blatantly flouted. 
Only after this demand has been met do people want to see 
financial devolution with revenues coming directly to the local 
institutions. One formerly influential MCC member sums up the 
situation as follows:
‘There’s a lot of talk from the committee about ‘devolution’ but 
if the RDC lets funds come direct to them they will disappear in 
days along with the rest of our money. We would like to see funds 
coming directly but not at the moment, our problems have to be 
sorted out first. The RDC is the only one that can help us do this. 
They are legally responsible as the holders of AA, and they must 
accept their responsibilities.’
Local people are collectively indicating that the RDC has an important 
role to play in fostering the conditions that will ensure their 
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empowerment. They could do this by providing neutral arbitration in 
a situation that at present cannot be addressed locally, owing to the 
current levels of distortion and complicated politics.  
People are clear that CAMPFIRE, by providing them with information 
about their rights and those of the other institutions involved, has 
provided them with the confidence and basis to express demands 
to the RDC:
‘People are very much aware of their rights and obligations and 
they know this because the old committee used to bare all things 
and read the constitution in public at AGMs and other meetings, 
we also know from this what the RDC should be doing.’ 
However, this does not imply that the RDC is viewed entirely 
favourably in Mahenye and mounting frustration was articulated 
by many. The RDC is perceived to be primarily concerned with 
ensuring maximum income from the hunting operations to meet its 
own financial needs at the expense of the people. The delays in re-
tendering are seen to be the result of the RDC trying to negotiate 
more favourable terms. These delays are bringing it into disrepute 
and fuelling damaging rumours about its motives: 
‘We know Chipinge RDC is aware of all the problems but they 
don’t assist, they are getting something from this.’
‘Tshabezi hunted in the area without a contract because he 
managed to bribe officials at the RDC. Now the intention of 
the council is to take over the running of CAMPFIRE because 
it generates so much money’.
The most striking element of the narrative is the level of agreement 
on the nature of the problem (local elite capture and distortion of 
the MCC and its core rules and roles) and how it can be solved 
(RDC intervention as an obligation of AA status, but not RDC as a 
substitute for MCC the institution of the bylaws). Despite problems 
(and dangers), the people of Mahenye continue to demonstrate the 
remarkable level of ‘intra-communal cohesiveness’ and capacity for 
expressing ‘constituency demands’ identified in Murphree’s past 
scholarship. 
4.4 The private sector
Private sector interests consist of the operator of the two lodges, River 
Lodges of Africa (RLA); the existing safari operator, Tshabezi Safaris; 
and Zambezi Safaris, who is tendering for the quota. Representatives 
of the Lodges (RLA) and Tshabezi were interviewed and told a 
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common story of how, since 2000, it had become increasingly difficult 
to have a professional relationship with the community. 
While they are both aware that there are conflicts about the level 
of accountability of the MCC to general community members, both 
still use the narrative of ‘the community’ and their actions are guided 
by the understanding that the MCC represents ‘the community’. 
Ultimately, the primary concern of both is the national economic 
and political system which is leading to a decline of tourists and 
threatening their businesses, although this is clearly more of a threat 
to the lodges than safari operations. 
Tshabezi’s story is one of wasted time, money and effort, a breach 
of trust and unprofessional conduct by both the RDC and the MCC. 
They are concerned with contracts going unsigned, lack of clarity 
on where responsibility lies or what the proper procedures and 
mechanisms for tendering should be. They fear that the current 
situation is leading to further degradation of a resource base that 
is already under pressure.   
‘We thought people were genuinely interested in the development 
of the area and so invested directly here, but it’s been a waste. 
We’ve negotiated contracts at a local level because that’s what the 
theory is all about, but we should have been talking with the RDC. 
Now there’s a conflict between the community and the RDC over 
allocation of funds and we are caught in the middle and made to 
look like the bad guys.’ 
The story told by representatives of the lodges differs slightly, as 
may be expected given the long-term investment the company is 
making in the area. As demonstrated in their promotional materials, 
the CAMPFIRE programme and its development and conservation 
benefits are an integral component of their marketing strategy. The 
discourse of CAMPFIRE – ‘participation, community benefits, local 
cultural traditions and incentives for conservation’ – is embedded in 
the management strategies and rational of the lodges and their staff. 
Although they are aware that there may be problems, these tend 
to be down-played:
‘We do tend to have our heads in the sand and don’t really 
know the details but we know the current chief is working in his 
own self-interest, leading the programme away from where it’s 
supposed to be going. But there are no indications that anyone is 
going to pose a direct challenge to the royal family. It’s the chief 
himself who will have to make the changes. To the extent that we 
get involved locally we do so through the legitimate structures, 
those of the chief and his family.’
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Thus, despite RLA being aware of misappropriation of funds and 
conflicts within the community, they continue to attempt to negotiate 
new contractual arrangements through the office of the chief as 
evidenced in the submission of a ‘Concept Document Proposing a 
New Partnership’ to Chief Mahenye, copied to the MCC, in late 2002. 
In this document it is proposed that:
‘A new company should be formed with shares issued to the 
community and the private sector. …The community will be 
expected to elect to the board of the new company the required 
number of directors appropriate to the community’s shareholding 
in the company.’
The proposal ends with a reminded of Mahenye’s historic value to the 
CAMPFIRE programme:
‘In 1982, Mahenye Ward pioneered the conservation concepts 
that later became enshrined in the CAMPFIRE programme. There 
is an opportunity to take the lead once again in conservation and 
sustainable development programmes by growing the partnership 
between the community and the private sector.’ 
Implicit in this document is the assumption that the chief and the 
MCC were the legitimate and accountable representatives of the 
people of Mahenye. According to our interviewees it was very clear 
even by this date that this was not the case. One explanation for 
this stance is that it harks back to a story line appropriate to the 
institutions of the 1990s, irrespective of the individual leadership 
changes from 2000 and the evolution of deep distortions that 
removed their local legitimacy. An alternative explanation, given by 
several members of staff who are from Mahenye, is that the reaction 
of senior management to local events has been one of pragmatic 
acceptance of the new political realities now prevalent at local and 
national scales.
‘The new chief doesn’t seem to understand that getting benefits 
from us is a privilege and not a right. He comes here and 
demands beers and other favours. He demands far too much from 
us and threatens if we don’t honour, because the general manager 
is white and he can be associated with MDC! We cannot retrench 
the chairman because he is such a powerful individual – removing 
him from the payroll will be disastrous to our relationship with the 
chieftainship.’
4.5 The RDC
The role of the RDC includes formal awarding of the hunting 
concession following an established process of advertising and 
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competitive tendering. As well as having a legal obligation in this 
regard, they also have a financial incentive to ensure that the process 
is efficiently managed as they are recipients of 20-35% of the income 
as an ‘administration’ fee. In theory, tenders are evaluated both in 
terms of financial value and on qualitative considerations, with the 
expectation that RDCs take into account the views of the wildlife-
producing ward. However, an independent commission of inquiry 
undertaken in 2005 at the request of the Chipinge RDC indicates 
that established procedure and competitive bidding processes have 
not been adhered to. The result is that there is
‘no clear relationship between the value of the resources and the 
total amount paid by the safari operator in terms of the contract’. 
Following a written request from the Mahenye Ward councillor, 
backed up by anonymous letters from Mahenye residents, the RDC 
undertook an independent audit of the MCC in 2004. As recounted 
above, this audit clearly revealed the validity of accusations of 
mismanagement and misappropriation of CAMPFIRE funds by the 
elite within Mahenye. 
It is against this background, (armed with comprehensive 
knowledge of both the conflict regarding the hunting concession 
provided by the commission of inquiry and financial mismanagement 
provided by the audit) that the RDC’s story of Mahenye is told. 
According to the  RDC’s CEO, the situation is ‘a big mess’ that has 
come about because ‘one individual is no longer accountable’, and is 
bringing the RDC into disrepute.
‘Chipinge is proud of being the birthplace of the CAMPFIRE 
concept, but now we are failing to live up to our reputation. 
We view it as a priority that things are put right.’
The RDC’s chosen strategy has been to analyse two elements of the 
problem: lack of accountability and conflicts between the community 
and the safari operator. 
‘And now we will approach the issues in stages. Our first priority 
is to sort out the problems with the safari operators. Once this 
is done we’ll address local problems of representation. Elections 
with a secret ballot need to take place, and new safeguards 
developed to make sure authority isn’t abused.’
They are well aware of the demands for greater fiscal devolu-
tion. The CEO says,
‘Personally, I don’t have a problem with the hunting fee going 
directly to the community, but we have to sort out the abuses 
first and the decision isn’t only mine to make.’ 
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The story then from the RDC is that they are aware of problems and 
are in the process of making a measured and responsible decision 
about how to proceed, in order to respond to the demands and needs 
of their constituency. Given such a reasonable response, it is fair 
to speculate why there has been so little action. The audit – which 
clearly illustrates fraud and corruption – was carried out in August 
2004, and the commission of inquiry took place in May 2005. And 
yet by October 2005, despite the CEO acknowledging that it was a 
priority for the RDC, no action had been taken. This may simply be 
a result of bureaucratic ineptitude, but once again it is possible to 
identify alternative reasons. 
Chief Mahenye’s position provides him with networks and outreach 
into politically powerful national factions that may influence the 
strategies adopted by and the nature of the relationship with the 
RDC. For example, the Deputy Minister of Local Government, 
Rural and Urban Development, (who additionally holds a leading 
post within the state-approved traditional chief’s institution) has 
attended meetings with the Mahenye CAMPFIRE committee at which 
discussions related to securing greater financial devolution from 
the RDC. The chief has also worked closely with the former District 
Administrator of Chipinge (himself now a Member of Parliament) to 
influence the Mahenye vote for the ZANU-PF MP candidate. These 
personal national networks and political affiliations provide a level of 
complexity in local power struggles that it is beyond the scope of this 
research to explore in detail. However, they have a real impact on the 
balance of power between the RDC and traditional authorities and 
this may at least partially account for the reluctance of the RDC to 
take any decisive action to date. 
4.6 The NGOs
The marginalisation of civil society from policy making and 
implementation in any sphere that relates to governance in the 
politically contested rural areas (described in a previous section) has 
had significant impacts on Mahenye CAMPFIRE. The consequence 
of this marginalisation is that the former CAMPFIRE Collaborative 
Group (CCG) members (particularly NGOs such as WWF and 
Zimbabwe Trust) who formerly played key roles in institutional 
development within Mahenye are no longer able to do so. 
Balint and Mashinya (In press) criticise NGOs for this, noting that 
‘the withdrawal of outside agencies responsible for oversight and 
assistance may be more to blame for this decline than the ongoing 
national turmoil’. This glosses over the reality that one of the many 
results of ‘the national turmoil’ has been to marginalise and exclude 
NGOs from playing their former roles, partly through denying them 
access to funds but also by removing their mandate. Contrary to the 
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findings of Balint and Mashinya (In press), those field staff who we 
interviewed and who had formerly operated in Mahenye were aware 
of the current situation in Mahenye. However, they not only had no 
means and resources with which to address the problem but also felt 
intimidated to try to do so. As expressed by one NGO officer formerly 
active in the area for a decade: 
‘[Our friends] in the RDC tell us Mahenye is a mess, the chief and 
chairman have taken over. I hate to hear it after years of working 
with them, but with no vehicles, no fuel, and no reason to go there, 
what can we do? Anyway, I’m known as MDC, the chief is ZANU-
PF, it wouldn’t be good for my health.’
The one NGO that is still highly active in CAMPFIRE implementation 
is the CAMPFIRE Association (CA). They are familiar with the current 
situation in Mahenye, not least because the CEO was a member of 
the commission of inquiry. They are involved with the RDC in seeking 
a solution to the problems based on their understanding that:
‘There are a lot of undeclared interests at play in Mahenye. 
There’s need to identify the root cause of the problem and sort 
out the institutional problems. We strongly felt as a commission 
that there was need for changes in tenure of office, to elect a new 
committee’.
As in the case of the RDC narrative, there is also a sense of deadlock 
in taking actions or decisions in the discourse of the CA; particularly 
given this is precisely the institution taxed (literally, given that CA 
membership fees are deducted from Mahenye revenue) with the task 
of linking the producer communities of CAMPFIRE with district and 
national agencies and with the overall coordination of the programme. 
A final set of narratives are those of recent researchers of 
CAMPFIRE in Mahenye. The narrative in Munyaka and Mandizadza 
(2004) is largely devoted to a binary view of the pros and cons of 
full devolution in a fairly conventional structural discourse that 
maintains, ‘the community of Mahenye is still in a power battle with 
the Chipinge RDC’. Effectively, this follows a similar narrative to that 
of the MCC chairman and chief noted earlier. From field work in mid 
2004, Balint (2005) and Balint and Mashinya (In press) are more 
focused on the narratives in academic research of the weaknesses of 
local level institutions in CBNRM and, as in this research, find a rich 
seam of local level corruption and local elite appropriation of benefits. 
Their analytical conclusions emphasise Mahenye CBNRM 
challenges as primarily being local in context and cause (rather 
than linked to, or a function of, wider national political or economic 
distortions and crisis) and specifically around a narrative of contrast 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 34
‘People are not Happy’ – Speaking up for Adaptive Natural Resource Governance in Mahenye
Elizabeth Rihoy, Chaka Chirozva and Simon Anstey
between ‘democratic’ modern systems and their perceptions of 
Mahenye’s customary forms of governance and society.
‘How can an independent, democratic, participatory governing 
process be helped to survive in a traditional, hierarchical, 
feudal society?’ (Balint 2005; emphasis added.)
Their conclusions are within the academic narratives of political 
ecology that is sceptical of idealised local community democratic 
institutions in CBNRM. From research in Mahenye they argue
‘…for caution in promoting full devolution of authority, particularly 
in the absence of safeguards to protect the broader community 
interest’ (Balint and Mashinya, In press).
5. Discussion
In discussing the issues of CBNRM, democratic governance, institutions and economic incentives in Mahenye, a good place to begin is to recognise the complexity of the current situation 
both in Zimbabwe and in Mahenye, but also the extent to which 
there is remarkable congruence and depth in the narratives of local, 
district and national scales about the reality of the challenges and the 
most urgent next steps to take. At the crux of the discourses are a 
multi-tiered and interrelated set of politically and socially constructed 
stalemates inhibiting those steps from being taken and permitting 
evolutions to occur. As summarised in the previous section by an 
interviewee, ‘people are not happy, but they don’t know where to 
complain’.
We also need to start with a particularly important 
acknowledgement about ‘practitioner-scholars’. The people of 
Mahenye have been in the CBNRM business for more than two 
decades (far longer than we or most other researchers) and in the 
wildlife management business and local governance business for 
longer still. This maturity comes through clearly in the narratives 
outlined in the previous section, and suggests the need for caution 
in extrapolating from current weaknesses an inherent institutional 
or inherent structural set of governance or societal problems. It 
argues against elevating a crisis at one point in time in Mahenye 
Ward to a generalised set of conclusions about the local political 
economy of CBNRM. 
In this context our best guide is to follow the narrative structure 
of the residents of the ward; identify the nature of the problems, the 
factors and contributing causes, the historical context, the scenarios 
for change involving new alliances or re-activated networks, and 
the concrete options available to break down stalemates. In short, 
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provide a contribution to ‘make a plan’ – that most enduring adaptive 
philosophy of Zimbabweans.
5.1 Local governance, CBNRM institutions and historical precedent
One of the paradoxes and strengths of the case of Mahenye, clear 
in the narratives from various sources, is the extent to which the 
ward, the dynamics of its governance and its institutional evolutions 
place it not just as a precursor to CBNRM in the region in 1982. 
Mahenye also reached a phase in the mid to late 1990s of practically 
implementing the more recent scholarship that stressed multi-
tiered governance linkages (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, In press) and 
jurisdictional and scale principles involving upward delegation/
downward accountability depending on political agency, ecological 
and social scale requirements (Martin 2003; Murphree 2001). It 
had in that decade moved beyond the ‘chicken and egg’ structural 
dilemma of full devolution as prerequisite for CBNRM versus fragile 
local common property regime as cause of failure of CBNRM. 
The egg had produced the chicken and the chicken produced 
the egg in a context of happy congruence where the strength of the 
local society (one not mired in feudal, hierarchical conditions but 
mixing the modern with the customary) had linked up to scales 
and institutions of the state, private sector and NGOs with powerful 
economic incentives and political capital supporting these evolutions. 
The challenge was to come from 2000 with the series of connected 
local and national events that generated the dramatic distortions to 
economic incentives, political dynamics and local leadership. The 
informal and precedent basis of the ‘Mahenye Constitution’ was 
inadequate to counterbalance this profound shift. In simple terms, 
the devolution-jurisdictional egg was hatching out in a much rougher 
neighbourhood.  
But it is important to stress (as do the majority of the local 
narratives from Mahenye, which speak of resilience and knowledge 
of the past strengths of their institutions) that this does not preclude 
the ability to react or adapt. From 1982–1991 there was a precedent 
of tackling significant challenges. This, plus the fact that the widely 
agreed-on strengths of the institution up to 2000 were achieved, gives 
hope that the scenarios and strategies for change envisaged by most 
Mahenye people can engage with the crisis of today. 
5.2 National to local links, mirrors and influences
While our research concurs with that of Balint and Mashinya (In 
press) in that problems in Mahenye do indeed reflect ‘local failures 
in governance and capacity’, we believe that their assertion that this 
is the primary cause of problems, with national levels issues being 
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peripheral, fails to reflect the situation facing Zimbabwe since 2000 
and that local governance is being significantly affected by national 
governance issues. As the following discussion highlights, the 
situation is far more complex than a ‘Mahenye in isolation’ analysis 
would imply. 
The situation in Zimbabwe, where political events of recent years 
have resulted in the promotion of institutions and individuals 
associated with the ruling party, while those affiliated with 
opposition parties and politics have been marginalised, has been 
comprehensively documented by many analysts, both Zimbabwean 
and foreign (Raftopoulos & Savage 2005; Bauer & Taylor 2005; 
Harold-Berry 2004; Hill 2005; Amnesty International 2004; 
Hammar & Raftopoulos 2003). In this regard the Mahenye situation 
mirrors the national, profoundly impacting on the balance of power 
between various Mahenye institutions as well as determining which 
individuals continue to play active roles within institutions, based 
upon their political affiliations. 
One of the most significant legislative changes promoting shifts 
in the institutional dynamics and balance of power within Mahenye 
has been the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 2001, which has 
strengthened the power of traditional authorities nationally while also 
bringing them under the influence of the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Until 
the passing of this Act, post-independence policy had strengthened 
the role of RDCs at the expense of traditional authorities. The TLA 
is a significant shift in direction, empowering chiefs, headmen and 
sabhukus, not least in terms of natural resource management. 
It provides for and demarcates the borders of ward and village 
assemblies to ‘consider and resolve’ all issues relating to land, water 
and other natural resources. Crucially, the Act does not provide land 
rights to the assemblies and it does not give them any legal status 
beyond being sub-committees of council. A common interpretation 
of the TLA is that it aims to co-opt traditional leadership to ensure 
political penetration of the ruling party into rural areas. This Act 
has not only enhanced the authority of the chief locally but has also 
changed the nature of the relationship between chiefs, RDC and the 
private sector.
Other changes which have influenced events in Mahenye include 
the creation of new and powerful institutions representing the party 
at local level. These include the ward coordinator (an employee of the 
Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation), while formerly 
relatively insignificant institutions, such as the ward chairman of 
ZANU PF, have taken on new prominence. Compounding this is 
that the modern development structures and their representatives, 
notably the ward councillor, have also come increasingly under the 
influence of and are accountable to the ruling party and are under 
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sometimes violent pressure to represent party interests in rural areas 
(See Hammar 2003 for a detailed account).12
But changes in the national context have not only been legislative 
or administrative. The year 2000 saw a dramatic and public shift in 
the political dynamics of Zimbabwe, culminating in an increase in 
politically motivated violence and in the collapse of the ‘rule of law’ 
(Raftopoulous 2005). This situation was undergirded by a racially 
and populist moral discourse about the return of African soil to 
Africans, adopted by the ruling party, which served to marginalise 
and vilify whites and, by inference, political opponents of the ruling 
party. At local levels this often translated into violent persecution 
and marginalisation of MDC supporters and, according to Wolmer et 
al. (2003),  introduced a suspicion of wildlife management as it was 
considered to be ‘a ploy of whites to forestall land acquisition and 
justifying multiple and extensive land holdings (p.8)’.
Many of those interviewed noted that the impact in Mahenye 
has been to support the process of marginalisation of key figures 
who were known to be opposition supporters from decision-making 
roles and a further reinforcement of the powers of the chief. Or as 
expressed by one interviewee:
‘People cannot make their concerns public for fear of being 
labelled opposition supporters.’
Thus the relationship between the traditional and ruling party 
institutions has fundamentally changed, with the result that power 
and influence of traditional authorities has been enhanced but at the 
expense of increased dependency on the ruling party. In Mahenye 
all power is vested in the chief (as distinct from the institution 
of customary authority) whose position is secure because of the 
mutually beneficial relationship and endorsement from ZANU-PF 
and the other newly created or co-opted institutions such as the MCC 
under the current chairman. The new roles acquired by the chief 
and his family translate into real power over and above what was 
traditionally extended to them.13 For example, one respondent noted 
that he was unwilling to publicly declare his dissatisfaction with 
CAMPFIRE and the MCC chairman because
‘The chairman is on the grain procurement and distribution 
committee and this gives him more power especially given this 
drought year. If you complain about CAMPFIRE, you may end up 
not getting food rations’.
The national context has enabled the chief to translate his newly 
enhanced legal position vis-à-vis natural resources and his new 
position as powerful ZANU-PF representative to divert the claims 
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of others and validate his own claims over these resources, thus 
expanding his control over development in Mahenye. One of the first 
actions undertaken by the chief on his ascendancy in 2001 was 
to ensure that CAMPFIRE and its benefits were brought under his 
control.
One of the curious features of the narratives and realities at the 
Mahenye scale is the degree to which they mirror national contexts. 
The increasing centralisation of power, factionalisation, the 
instrumentalisation of disorder for economic gain by elites, the 
distortion of institutions, the vanguard mentality towards the 
constituent electors, and the creation of a stalemate with few ‘honest 
brokers’ has remarkable reflections at other scales, and specifically, 
the national one. That CAMPFIRE Mahenye shows some sign of being 
able to break the stalemate is possibly a harbinger of future scenarios 
at other scales. At least the current process supports the perspective 
that in CBNRM there are powerful elements of, and lessons for, 
applied democracy and that governance evolutions are not only a 
one-way street from above. 
5.3 Economic factors - CAMPFIRE incentives
The narratives and realities of Mahenye illustrate that the local and 
national institutional distortions are also present in the economic 
context. The dramatic fall in institutional norms are spectacularly 
illustrated by the decline in household dividends, between the late 
1990s and 2004, from around US$20 to a mere three cents. The real 
decline of the proportion of revenue allocated to household dividends 
fell from around 50% to less than 1%. Effectively, the ward residents 
(beyond those employed in the lodge/hunting industry and the elite of 
MCC) are getting no economic returns from their wildlife management 
or recompense from the costs of living with wildlife. In fact, the 
economics of wildlife management in Mahenye currently favour 
individual, illegal or unsustainable incentives. As one youth noted,
‘If people kill a duiker or impala they can make Z$100,000 (US$ 
4 at mid 2005 rates) from the meat or can exchange for getting 
mealie-meal.’
He also elaborated on the economics of palm wine or utchema. He 
gets paid Z$5,000/litre, harvests up to 20 litres a day and can make 
as much as Z$500,000 a week (or US$20/week). Again, this method 
enables exchange or barter for food or other assets. He is proof 
against inflation and can diversify between cash and barter.
This is in contrast to the formal, bureaucratic and minimal returns 
from CAMPFIRE revenue mechanisms, which are now effectively 
a long pipeline of massive leakages, exposed to foreign exchange 
losses, inflation at the world’s highest rates, ad hoc taxes, fraud and 
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minimal transparency. The paradox is that Mahenye’s main resource 
is elephant hunting, which is in high demand. The elephants in 
Mahenye (‘produced’ in the nearby national park) are prime trophies 
in an international context and have a consistently high value in 
US$. Crude estimates14 can be made of the potential US$ value from 
Mahenye’s elephant quota and the potential household dividends. 
Where the potential revenue in 2003/4 was US$39,000 with a 
household dividend of US$21, the actual dividend was US$0.03. 
The combined revenue disbursed as household dividend for the 
894 households in Mahenye in 2004 was therefore a total of US$27. 
Thus in effect, the stakeholders of Mahenye sold US$39,000 worth of 
elephant for a return of US$27, which represented a more than 99% 
loss in revenue. This clearly makes no economic sense (and even 
discounted local corruption leakages). The huge losses due to macro-
economic factors, exchange rates and inflation would argue that the 
ward and the RDC are being seriously prejudiced by maintaining a 
mechanism suited to a previous economic environment. 
No businessman in Zimbabwe would currently be undertaking 
transactions of foreign exchange assets into a pipeline of such 
destruction of value but, like the youth interviewed, would be looking 
for rapid turnover, barter of assets for assets of equal value or, in this 
particular case, perhaps retain a foreign exchange account system. 
These realities present opportunities (and urgencies) for re-thinking 
the Zimbabwe $ cash base economic incentives of CAMPFIRE’s past. 
They also present strategic options for alliances between ward level, 
RDC and new private sector economic exchanges (given the shared 
lose-lose position of all stakeholders) that could be mechanisms for 
promoting the breaking down of the current constructed stalemate.
5.4 Networks, patronage and power
By ‘capturing’ CAMPFIRE in Mahenye, the traditional authorities 
have created a powerful patronage tool for themselves through 
which they can construct and reproduce power relationships and 
perpetuate their authority. CAMPFIRE provides the means to develop 
a strong network of loyal supporters. This begins with the enrolment 
of other members of their extended family as MCC members, 
ensuring that they receive significant financial benefits in the form 
of sitting allowances, access to valuable transport and prestige. The 
chairman and chief have ensured that these people are beholden to 
them. By extending the First Friday meetings to include all members 
of the traditional authorities and other party-endorsed positions, 
such as the ZANU-PF chairman, ward development officer and 
councillor, this network has been extended to all those in positions 
of authority in the village. The network is extended outside family by 
the manipulation of scarce and valuable employment opportunities 
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within the CAMPFIRE project itself. For example, posts for game 
monitors, grinding mill operators and shop assistants, among others, 
are now decided upon exclusively by the MCC. 
The same is true of jobs with the private sector operators who, 
by wilfully maintaining the façade that the chairman of the MCC 
represents ‘the community’, give him leverage over who is appointed 
to these positions. Other benefits that the chairman extends to his 
network members include the provision of credit at the grinding mills 
and CAMPFIRE stores, provision of personal loans (most of which 
remain outstanding), and other forms of preferential treatment, 
such as not standing at grinding mill queues. By consolidating 
their positions of power in other institutions outside the MCC, the 
chairman and chief can threaten retribution to any who question 
their decisions, not just in the form of losing the benefits that have 
been forthcoming from being part of their network, but also through 
the potential loss of access to food aid, land or being labelled an 
opposition supporter. This last threat can also be extended to private 
sector operators and the RDC through the manipulation of their 
national political networks. 
Thus the chief and chairman would appear to have built 
themselves an unassailable position of power and authority. Yet 
this is clearly not the case. There is unanimous condemnation of 
the chairman (many, particularly the traditional authorities, were 
careful to draw a distinction between the chief and the chairman) and 
unanimous agreement on the need to find a solution to the current 
problems, even though such a solution would probably lead to them 
losing their privileged positions as network beneficiaries. 
But although there is widespread discontent, the situation within 
Mahenye remains a socially and politically constructed stalemate 
with no local means of sufficient agency or power to break the 
deadlock. Therefore people have identified alternative mechanisms to 
assist them to solve their problems. The long and successful history 
of CAMPFIRE in the area has ensured that there is considerable local 
knowledge about the process, including a thorough understanding 
of the roles, agency and responsibilities of various institutions. Thus 
while the RDC is widely distrusted on the grounds that it has its 
own agenda in relation to the safari operations and securing its own 
revenue, there is nevertheless clear recognition within Mahenye that 
it has a legal responsibility to step in to break the local stalemate and 
that it has the (albeit so far latent) political agency and state-party 
linkages to do so. 
It is generally recognised that this consists of two different 
but interconnected activities. Firstly, addressing issues of local 
governance and secondly addressing fiscal accountability and 
revenue efficiency (such as the controversy over the sport hunting 
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contract and the major leakages of revenue earned). Only once these 
issues have been resolved do the majority of people in Mahenye 
want to see greater fiscal devolution occurring. That is to say, their 
scenario for change is a sequence of events in rebuilding a process 
of devolution based on responsibilities and authority but also with 
linkages of strategic delegation and practical politics to get there. 
5.5 Building accountability - linking the local and district
The narratives suggest that one of the most significant impacts of 
CAMPFIRE over the last 15 years has been to empower local people 
by making them aware of the value of the natural resources in their 
areas and the extent of their rights to these, while raising awareness 
of mechanisms through which they can exercise these rights.   
Mahenye illustrates that community members can have the 
knowledge, confidence and organisational awareness to counter 
local elites who are usurping power and undermining democratic 
local decision making and to articulate demands to their political 
representatives at the district level to assist in resolving the problem. 
Thus despite the fact that local political mobilisation has had to be 
largely covert to date – due to fear of reprisal – it has nevertheless 
created space for political negotiation between the local and district 
level and has served as a catalyst to two external and damning 
investigations. This could ultimately lead to greater accountability of 
the RDCs to their local constituents. 
Allied with a strategy of practical politics in a win-win approach to 
the revenue and economic incentives for the residents of the ward, 
the RDC and the private sector, the potential for breaking the current 
stalemate certainly exists.
6. Conclusions and lessons
‘The very nature of nation states is such that people will never 
be free of the regimes they create or tolerate but neither will the 
state ever be free of the demands of the people for whom they 
act. Getting the balance right is what current democratisation 
in the subcontinent is all about. As each step is taken towards 
enhancing the proprietorial interest of the ordinary citizen in 
current land reform, the nature of state power itself is altered, 
each time settling a little nearer to the landholder, who in 
turn is forced and empowered to be a little less passive in his 
or her relation to the state. It is arguably from these kinds of 
developments that tangible improvements can be made, both in 
the formal processes of democracy, and in social relations more 
generally.’ (Alden Wily 2003)
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Alden Wily’s analysis, albeit in the context of land reform, stresses 
elements that, from this research, we would conclude as being key 
to the situation in Mahenye; that CBNRM is a process of applied and 
incremental experiments of democracy; of value because it involves 
not a single ‘holy grail’ of full devolution or ‘ideal democracy’ but the 
interaction of tiers of governance over time in adaptive processes.
What could be construed as a ‘failure’ or ‘crisis’ at any one moment is 
in reality part of an ongoing development that, in this case, contains 
the seeds of opportunities for rural people to develop organisational 
mechanisms and abilities through which they can articulate their 
demands. The analysis, as drawn out in the narratives presented 
here, demonstrates that CAMPFIRE has had a real impact in terms 
of empowering local residents, providing them with incentives, 
knowledge and organisational abilities to identify and address their 
own problems, recognise the constraints that they are operating 
within and identify where external interventions are required. 
It is apparent that alliances and boundaries are formed in CBNRM, 
and when situations change these alliances and boundaries shift 
and reconfigure the landscape of governance and politics of natural 
resource management. The situation currently facing Mahenye 
is, in the stories of the residents themselves, just a snapshot of a 
moment in time. Their eye is on the future and how to bring about an 
outcome that is favourable to all people in Mahenye and not just to 
the temporarily powerful local elite. Thus what an observer may view 
as a ‘crisis’ is viewed by many local inhabitants as part of an ongoing 
contest for control over resources within which lie opportunities for 
positive change.  
The situation in Mahenye illustrates that CBNRM is a political 
process, and therefore implementers and policy advocates need to 
understand power relations and the political landscape in their quest 
for better governance and socio-economic and political empowerment 
and be strategic in engaging with these. There are political risks 
involved in CBNRM. It is the recognition and translation of political 
capital into a political tool for mobilising power and bringing demands 
to bear on relevant authorities that ensures that local communities 
influence CBNRM policy and enlarge both the political and policy 
spaces for participation.15 While in Zimbabwe RDCs are notoriously 
associated with ‘capturing’ CAMPFIRE benefits (Bond 2001; Child 
et al. 2003; Katerere 2001; Shackleton & Campbell 2001; Roe et 
al. 2000) the evidence from Mahenye indicates that in the current 
context of Zimbabwe, RDCs could provide a system of checks and 
balances at the local level that could prevent capture of the process 
by local elites.
But our argument goes further than simply acknowledging the 
vital role of local government and addresses the broader issue of 
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democratisation. Local government has a vital role to play in ensuring 
democratic outcomes. Mamdani (1996) argues that ‘participatory 
forms (empowerment) that stress the autonomy of a bounded group 
– only to undermine any possibility of an alliance-building majority-
based representation – can justify and uphold the most undemocratic 
forms of central power’ and draws upon various cases studies to 
illustrate what ‘began with an emphasis on participation [and] ended 
up with a warlord’. He concludes that ‘to create a democratic solidarity 
requires joining the emphasis on autonomy with the one on alliance, 
that on participatory self-rule with one on representational politics’.  
Put simply, a properly democratic system requires the effective 
linking of the local and national. CBNRM provides a means and 
incentives by which this can be done. Mahenye, although based on 
informally legitimised institutional foundations (the bylaws) was in 
the process of doing this in the late 1990s. Now, in more complex 
times, it retains the potential to do so again and provide new lessons 
to those that invigorated the practice and theory of regional CBNRM 
in the past.   
We maintain that the longstanding ‘devolutionary’ discourse that 
has dominated CBNRM debate within southern Africa does not 
accommodate the realities of the highly politicised context in which 
CBNRM occurs. Rihoy & Maguranyanga (In press), in a comparative 
analysis of the CBNRM policy process in Botswana and Zimbabwe,  
illustrate that the role of local government in actor-networks is 
crucial to sustain CBNRM in the face of threats to recentralise, 
which serve the interests of some political economic elites. The 
emphasis on devolution that has dominated CBNRM debate has often 
polarised the issue of governance and the potential positive aspects 
between first and second level tiers of governance; in other words, 
the relationship between producer wards and RDCs, in Zimbabwe’s 
case. It would be more productive to focus on understanding 
and developing viable local governance regimes that enable rural 
constituents to demand accountability from local government 
structures. Focus in scholarship in CBNRM could perhaps benefit 
from the kind of analysis we have attempted in this paper; of looking 
beyond devolution (the often simplistic discourses of devolved versus 
centralised governance) to a recognition that issue, context and 
circumstance should be allowed to determine the use of structure.16
Contrary to perspectives of Mahenye as another example of 
CBNRM in crisis, our interpretation of Mahenye narratives is an 
optimistic one of evolution and resilience. At the local level, there is 
ample evidence that many of those factors which Murphree (2001) 
identified as decisive to their overall success are still present; notably 
that of intra-communal cohesion, but also resource richness, social 
energy, flexibility and evolution, and acceptance of risk. But it also 
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provides evidence that CBNRM is evolving and has empowered local 
communities with the means and incentive to engage and negotiate 
with their local government representatives. But if this process is to 
gain strength within the current context of Zimbabwe, new creative 
thinking will be required. 
Two crucial elements need further careful attention by the 
implementers and analysts of the programme if the ‘people are not 
happy, they don’t know where to complain’ appeal is to be answered. 
• Firstly, there is need to structure new approaches to the 
economic mechanisms of CAMPFIRE that can produce win-win 
incentives between stakeholders. 
• Secondly, there is need for mechanisms that tackle the practical 
governance arrangements between the first and second tier 
institutions that can progressively break down the current social 
and politically constructed stalemates. 
7. Postscript
In the last quarter of 2005, an Annual General Meeting was held 
in Mahenye. Tempers flew. People accused each other of lying. 
There were veiled threats of violence. Most villagers present made 
open submissions that there were institutional problems troubling 
CAMPFIRE. 
With the assistance of the Rural District Council, local elections 
were held and a new committee was elected. These local elections 
entirely removed the previous committee and traditional leadership 
from CAMPFIRE. CAMPFIRE is now being run in line with the 
provisions of the Mahenye CAMPFIRE bylaws. 
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9. Footnotes
1  Narratives and counter-narratives draw on the work of Emery 
Roe (see Roe 1991) and are used to explore the significance of 
particular sets of ideas or discourses or stories, the ways that 
they are contested and evolve; and how they provide plausible 
explanations and can persist in the face of even strong empirical 
evidence against their story lines (see Adams and Hulme 2001 
for more discussion). Used here for stories from or about 
Mahenye (and told by policy makers, academics, local officials 
and community members) they are not necessarily the ‘truth’ but 
more importantly, valid as their own explanation for reality and 
its causal features.
2  This paper defines devolution in accordance with the definition 
provided by Murphree (2000). He interprets devolution as 
‘the creation of relatively autonomous realms of authority, 
responsibility and entitlement, with a primary accountability 
to their own constituencies’.  Quite distinct to this process is 
that of decentralisation which Murphree defines as ‘refer[ing] 
to the delegation of authority and responsibility to subordinate 
and dispersed units of hierarchical jurisdiction, which retain 
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a primary accountability upward to their superiors in the 
hierarchy.’ 
3  Murphree 2001 notes about the RDC allocation of 20% +  of 
overall revenue for ‘administration’: ‘It is difficult to argue this 
figure represents actual administration expenses by the Council 
for the Mahenye enterprise and this figure can more properly be 
considered a council tax on Mahenye’s revenues.’
4  The population of Mahenye is approximately 6000, comprising 
894 households with an average of six people per household. 
It could therefore be anticipated, and indeed it was the case 
throughout the 1990s, that approximately 1000 people would be 
in attendance at an AGM. While no minutes of AGMs have been 
kept since 2000, the most generous estimates for attendance at 
each of the two AGMs since this date were put at 200–300 people.
5  A mentality essentially similar to that adopted in the ‘democratic 
centralism’ model of one party states and justification for the 
‘vanguard party/leadership’ institutions (see Anstey 2005 for 
discussion of such governance models with regard to CBNRM in 
Mozambique.)
6  It is worth noting that an attempt to triangulate this ‘official’ 
figure of overall revenues with those of the MCC finance officer, or 
the private sector available records/statements, produced wildly 
different amounts (in the range of Z$ tens of millions) suggesting 
a high level of lack of transparency or chaotic financial controls. 
7  There is also a large (three times) discrepancy between the official 
figure of RDC that Z$15,015,943 was disbursed as HH dividend 
and the actual (prior to development tax) dividend disbursed by 
MCC of Z$5,453,400 (calculated from HH payment of Z$6,100 x 
894 households). 
8  The MCC chairman is also employed by River Lodges of Africa 
– the operator of the existing two lodges in the area – as their 
‘community liaison officer’, which further obscures loyalties and 
perceptions.
9  This comment is also a powerful summary of the now highly 
politicised Zimbabwe rural landscape and the distortions of three 
normally separate institutions – the chief (traditional authority), 
district administrator (civil servant) and ZANU-PF (political party) 
– which have become interlinked. 
10  This house was demolished at the height of the controversy 
over the re-tendering process. Several interviewees noted that 
its demolition followed the realisation that building a house for 
the chief was problematic because it would bring the political 
interests of those in power locally into conflict with their external 
political patrons. Essentially it represented the private sector 
(a murungu) trying to buy out a state representative. This was 
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in flagrant contradiction of the newly politicised and racialised 
discourse of the ruling party. 
11  This perception can be traced to a/ the actual decline in 
revenues being paid due to actual declines in lodge income; b/ 
the mechanisms of payments made being directly often to MCC 
elite/chairman (without transparency to the wider community) 
and c/ in a complex accounting process with prior major value 
deductions for services rendered for vehicle repairs, tyres, 
advances and so on, that are focused on ‘assets’ of the MCC elite/
chairman. Such combinations fuel perceptions among the people 
about the lodges’ behaviour, which, in the absence of transparent 
information, results in the breakdown of trust.   
12  The actual or attempted co-option of the RDCs by the ruling party 
is an open secret in Zimbabwe. In Chipinge, a big sign outside the 
RDC HQ announces the HQ of ZANU-PF.
13  Following an internal audit conducted by the RDC on CAMPFIRE 
in Mahenye criticised the programme and, by implication, the 
traditional leadership, the chief had notices put up in buildings 
accessed by the public which declared that ‘every committee in 
Mahenye must be led by chaukes (people from the chief’s family).
14  Estimates of ‘leakages’ in  2004 – elephant hunting only: 
 Assumption 1: Five elephants were on quota and shot in 2003/4; 
trophy fees US$10,000 (see Campfire 2002 data) for + 20kg 
elephant and US$ 4,500 for smaller.
 Assumption 2: Conservative estimate (WWF-SARPO 2002 
Mahenye hunt records) of three elephants X US$ 10,000 + two 
elephants x US$ 4,500 = total Mahenye Campfire revenue from 
elephant hunting of US$ 39,000. 
 Assumption 3: 50% of revenue used for HH dividend (as was case 
prior to 2000) = US$ 19,500.
 Assumption 4: Number of households in 2004 is 894 = HH 
revenue of US$ 21.81.
15  Luckham et al. (2000) advanced the need to exploit existing 
or open new ‘political spaces’ to ensure that participatory 
democratic politics are promoted in emerging liberal democracies. 
These ‘political spaces’ take ‘those forms of political activity and 
organization that constitute individuals as equal, active and 
responsible citizens as opposed to subjects of the state’ and ‘those 
political opportunities [that] exist or can be created for citizens to 
gain access to the public sphere and hold governments and state 
elites accountable within it’ (p. 26). This statement highlights 
the need to create political space and conditions that resist elite 
capture and suppression of marginal and poor groups through 
mechanisms for accountability and fair representation.
16  The authors are grateful to Marshall Murphree for this insight.
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